Böcker i Elements in Metaphysics-serien

This Element is a survey of central topics in the metaphysics of material objects. The topics are grouped into four problem spaces.

Philosophical thinking about time is characterised by tensions between competing conceptions. Common sense suggests there is an objective present, and that time is dynamic. Science recognises neither feature. This Element examines McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time.

Persistence realism is the view that ordinary sentences that we think and utter about persisting objects are often true. Persistence realism involves both a semantic claim, about what it would take for those sentences to be true, and an ontological claim about the way things are. According to persistence realism, given what it would take for persistence sentences to be true, and given the ontology of our world, often such sentences are true. According to persistence error-theory, they are not. This Element considers several different views about the conditions under which those sentences are true. It argues for a view on which it is relatively easy to vindicate persistence realism, because all it takes is for the world to be the way it seems to us. Thereby it argues for the view that relations of numerical identity, or of being-part-of-the-same-object, are neither necessary nor sufficient for persistence realism.

Historically, philosophical discussions of relations have featured chiefly as afterthoughts, loose ends to be addressed only after coming to terms with more important and pressing metaphysical issues. F. H. Bradley stands out as an exception. Understanding Bradley's views on relations and their significance today requires an appreciation of the alternatives, which in turn requires an understanding of how relations have traditionally been classified and how philosophers have struggled to capture their nature and their ontological standing. Positions on these topics range from the rejection of relations altogether, to their being awarded the status as grounds for everything else, to various intermediary positions along this spectrum. Love them, hate them, or merely tolerate them, no philosopher engaged in ontologically serious metaphysics can afford to ignore relations.

"Truthmaking is the metaphysical exploration of the idea that what is true depends upon what exists. Truthmaker theorists argue about what the truthmaking relation involves, which truths require truthmakers, and what those truthmakers are. This Element covers the dominant views on these core issues in truthmaking"--

This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism, and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: (radical) scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.

Although the subject matter of this Element is properties, do not expect in-depth introductions to the various views on properties 'on the market'. Instead, here that subject matter is treated meta-philosophically. Rather than ask and try to answer a question like do properties exist? this Element asks what reasons one might have for thinking that properties exist (what problem properties, if they exist, are there to solve), what counts as solving that (or those) problems (including what counts as 'a property'), as well as how we ought to proceed when trying to find out if properties exist (by which method this ought to be decided). As it turns out, these questions and their answers are all intricately intertwined. Theory comparison and theory evaluation is in other words (and perhaps not that surprisingly) tricky. Do properties exist? After reading this Element all we can say is therefore this: that depends.

Identity criteria are powerful tools for the metaphysician. They tell us when items are identical or distinct. Some varieties of identity criteria also try to explain in virtue of what items are identical or distinct. This Element has two objectives: to discuss formulations of identity criteria and to take a closer look at one notorious criterion of object identity, Leibniz's Law. The first section concerns the form of identity criteria. The second section concerns the better-regarded half of Leibniz's Law, the indiscernibility of identicals. The third section turns to the more controversial half of Leibniz's Law, the identity of indiscernibles. The author considers alternatives to Leibniz's Law as well as the possibility that there are no adequate identity criteria to be found.

This Element examines the contemporary literature on essence in connection with the traditional question whether essence lies within or without our world. Section 1 understands this question in terms of a certain distinction, the distinction between active and latent facts. Section 2 steps back to investigate the connections between essence and other philosophical concepts. Section 3 brings the results of this investigation to bear on the traditional question, sketching an argument from the premise that essentialist facts are explained by the origins of things to the conclusion that such facts are active.

Substance has long been one of the key categories in metaphysics. This Element focuses on contemporary work on substance, and in particular on contemporary substance ontologies, metaphysical systems in which substance is one of the fundamental categories and individual substances are among the basic building blocks of reality. The topics discussed include the different metaphysical roles which substances have been tasked with playing; different critieria of substancehood (accounts of what is it to be a substance); arguments for and against the existence of substances; and different accounts of which entities, if any, count as substances.

"This Element provides an opinionated introduction to the metaphysics of laws of nature"--

"As we understand them, dispositions are relatively uncontroversial 'predicatory' properties had by objects disposed in certain ways. By contrast, powers are hypothetical 'ontic' properties posited in order to explain dispositional behaviour. Section 1 outlines this distinction in more detail. Section 2 offers a summary of the issues surrounding analysis of dispositions and various strategies in contemporary literature to address them, including one of our own. Section 3 describes some of the important questions facing the metaphysics of powers, including why they are worth positing and how they might metaphysically explain laws of nature and modality"--

"The way we represent the world in thought and language is shot through with indeterminacy: we speak of red apples, and yellow apples, without thereby committing to any sharp cutoff between the application of the predicate 'red' and of the predicate 'yellow'. But can reality itself be indeterminate? In other words, can indeterminacy originate in the mindindependent world, and not only in our representations? If so, can the phenomenon also arise at the microscopic scale of fundamental physics? The first part of this volume provides a brief overview of the question of indeterminacy. Part two discusses the thesis that the world is comprised of indeterminate objects, whereas part three focuses on the thesis that there are indeterminate states of affairs. Finally, part four is devoted to the case study of indeterminacy in quantum physics"--

The Odd Universe Argument aims to show that from four intuitive assumptions about parts and wholes, we can conclude a priori that there is an odd number of things in the universe. This Element investigates how this is so and where things might have gone awry. Section 1 gives an overview of general methodology, basic mereology, and plural logic. Section 2 explores questions about the nature of composition and decomposition. Does composition always occur? Never? Sometimes? Is the universe, at rock bottom, just many partless bits (simples)? Or do the parts have parts all the way down (gunk)? Section 3 looks at arguments for and against the thesis that composition is identity, with a healthy bias in its favor. In the wake of this discussion, we reconsider our methods of counting. We conclude with a return to the odd universe argument and suggestions on how best to resist it.