Böcker i Oxford Ethics Series-serien

This volume continues the examination of issues of life and death which F.M. Kamm began in 'Morality, Mortality,' Volume I (1993). Kamm continues her development of a non-consequentialist ethical theory and its application to practical ethical problems.

Why is death bad for us, even on the assumption that it involves the absence of experience? Whom should we save from death if we cannot save everyone? Kamm considers these questions, critically examining some answers other philosophers have given.

Bioethical Prescriptions collects F.M. Kamm's articles on bioethics - revised for publication in book form - which have appeared over the last 25 years and which have made her among the most widely-respected philosophers working in this field.

The Moral Target: Aiming at Right Conduct in War and Other Conflicts comprises essays that discuss aspects of war and other conflicts in the light of nonconsequentialist ethical theory.

This magisterial work is the first comprehensive study of the ethics of killing, where the moral status of the individual killed is uncertain. Drawing on philosophical notions of personal identity and the immorality of killing, McMahan looks carefully at a host of practical issues, including abortion, infanticide, the killing of animals, assisted suicide, and euthanasia.

Hurka gives an account of perfectionism, which holds that certain states of humans, such as knowledge, achievement and friendship are good apart from any pleasure they may bring, and that the morally right act is always the one that most promotes these states. Beginning with an analysis of its central concepts, Hurka tries to regain for perfectionism a central place in contemporary moral debate.

Basing itself on the premise that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand on individuals, and also that certain types of acts are simply forbidden, this book argues that attempts to defend these sorts of moral limits are inadequate.

This ethical study examines the concepts of quality and inequality and addresses the question: how can we judge between different types of inequality? The author examines inequality as applied to individuals and groups, and the standard measures in inequality employed by economists and others.

In examining the duty to relieve suffering, the author argues that this duty is stronger than most of us acknowledge. He offers an account of the meaning of suffering, and moves on to discuss its moral significance, the resolution of trade-offs and when relief of suffering is not morally required.

Recognizing that we live not in an ideal world (where obligations are shared equally) but in an actual and nonideal world, Murphy says that the real problem with utilitarianism is that it makes unfair demands on people who comply with it when most others do not.

Questions the moral importance of some non-consequentialist distinctions, and then introduces and argues for the moral importance of other distinctions. This book provides an introduction to non-consequentialist ethical theory followed by a discussion of distinctions relevant to instrumental rationality and to the famous "Trolley Problem".

In choosing between moral alternatives - choosing between various forms of ethical action - we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics.

In choosing between moral alternatives - choosing between various forms of ethical action - we typically make calculations of the following kind, using the principle of transitivity : A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. Larry Temkin shows is that if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions.

In a world of limited resources, competition between the young and old prompt difficult questions of justice. In countries with public pension and health care systems, or with aging populations, there is often a concern that members of different generations are not always treated fairly. Dennis McKerlie''s monograph examines justice between age-groups with the ultimate goal of a new theory of justice that effectively grapples with those questions. In the realm ofpublic policy and medical ethics this is an important and timely topic, but surprisingly one that has received relatively little attention from moral philosophers. McKerlie develops a comprehensive view of fairness between age groups that applies the egalitarian values of equality, or priority for thebadly off, to temporal parts of lives ΓÇö not just to complete lives.