Böcker i Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions-serien

Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes.

Integrates economics and politics, theory and econometrics, to provide the first coherent and general formal model of US political economy. Addresses formal tests of rationality in voting behaviour and rational voter behaviour when the executive and legislature are chosen simultaneously. Blends game theory, macroeconomics, voting theory, and econometrics.

This book uses a rational-choice approach to study the impact of Japanese law on economic growth in Japan.

Managerial Dilemmas extends the use of analytical techniques from organisational economics to the spheres of organisational culture and leadership in politics and business.

Most citizens seem under-informed about politics. Many experts claim that only well-informed citizens can make good political decisions. Is this claim correct? In The Democratic Dilemma, Professors Lupia and McCubbins combine insights from political science, economics and the cognitive sciences to explain how citizens gather and use information.

Explores the nature of institutions and institutional change.

This 2001 book explains why African countries have remained mired in a disastrous economic crisis since the late 1970s. It shows that dynamics internal to African state structures largely explain this failure to overcome economic difficulties rather than external pressures on these same structures as is often argued. Far from being prevented from undertaking reforms by societal interest and pressure groups, clientelism within the state elite, ideological factors and low state capacity have resulted in some limited reform, but much prevarication and manipulation of the reform process, by governments which do not really believe that reform will be effective, which often oppose reforms because they would undercut the patronage and rent-seeking practices which undergird political authority, and which lack the administrative and technical capacity to implement much reform. Over time, state decay has increased.

The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation - and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal theory: in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards - including the courts, political parties, and the people - cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar's rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness.

This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Diaz dictatorship (1876-1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.

This book analyzes the structural and political roots of financial crises across countries and over time, honing in on two specific variables, foreign capital inflows and financial market structure. It explains how these factors interact to make some countries more vulnerable to banking crises than others.

Ingham explores how multiple, overlapping majorities can have control in a democracy, even if there is not a unified 'will of the people'. This book will be of interest to political theorists as well as political scientists who study electoral accountability, representation, and social choice theory.

Just when Japan and the US are both caught up in a major debate over the effectiveness of their governments this volume offers new explanations of their comparative strengths and weaknesses. Why can Japan keep building nuclear power plants but face difficulty building an information superhighway? Why is the opposite the case in the US?

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical model of how parties create and then maintain or replace new governments. The theory involves strategic interaction and its consequences, then tests empirical hypotheses with data drawn from postwar European parliamentary democracies.

First published in 1987, Congress: Structure and Policy is a review of congressional research from an institutional perspective. The selections blend theoretical material with classics on such standard topics as elections and campaigning, controlling the bureaucracy, committees and committee assignments reform, budgeting, presidential influence, and the party and its leadership.

Originally published in 1997, The Political Economy of Property Rights investigates the transformation of property rights in post-communist countries and China. The movement to effective market economies requires the creation of effective supporting institutions. This process is inherently political, and thus should be studied from the perspective of political economy.

The book assesses the impact of political and social institutions on regulatory structures in the telecommunications industry in five countries.

Surprisingly little is known about the constitutional relationship between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes; the present volume seeks to remedy this.

Ideology and Strategy is an analysis of issues in Swedish parliamentary history over the past 100 years. Leif Lewin has chosen eight issues and scrutinized them using traditional analysis and, importantly, game-theoretic reasoning.

Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution.

Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.

How are decisions taken in the European Union? How important are the formal decision-making procedures in defining decision outcomes and the bargaining that takes place among the actors involved? This volume addresses questions that are central to understanding how the EU works and how it makes important legislative decisions.

Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.

How are decisions taken in the European Union? How important are the formal decision-making procedures in defining decision outcomes and the bargaining that takes place among the actors involved? This volume addresses questions that are central to understanding how the EU works and how it makes important legislative decisions.

This collection of empirical studies analyses historical and contemporary institutions and institutional change in various parts of the world.

This collection of empirical studies analyses historical and contemporary institutions and institutional change in various parts of the world.

Just when Japan and the US are both caught up in a major debate over the effectiveness of their governments this volume offers new explanations of their comparative strengths and weaknesses. Why can Japan keep building nuclear power plants but face difficulty building an information superhighway? Why is the opposite the case in the US?

A thorough critique of a wide range of theories of institutional change followed by the development of a new theory that emphasises the role of distributional conflict in the emergence of social institutions.

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical model of how parties create and then maintain or replace new governments. The theory involves strategic interaction and its consequences, then tests empirical hypotheses with data drawn from postwar European parliamentary democracies.

Political economy has been an essential realm of inquiry and has attracted myriad intellectual adherents for much of the period of modern scholarship. This volume calls for a reaffirmation of the importance of the unified study of political economy, and explores the frontiers of the interaction between politics and markets.

There is surprisingly little comparative work on how presidential democracies function. The essays in this volume show, through case studies from Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, how presidential democracies deal with the challenges of economic reform.