Böcker i Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory-serien

This collection of essays investigates Plantiga's warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. It provides a statement of the variety of approaches to the nature of warrant within contemporary epistemology and to the connections between epistemology and metaphysics.

Only recently have epistemologists taken seriously the idea that social relations play a primary and not merely supportive role in the conditions of knowledge. These essays explore issues spanning the burgeoning field of social epistemology.

Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgements. This collection of essays covers how psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical enquiry.

Epistemic foundationalism has been attacked by a wide range of theorist over the years. DePaul uses these attacks as proof that foundationalism is not a thing of the past, but instead points to the strength and coherence of the position.

In this collection of nine essays, Will demonstrates that a social account of human knowledge is consistent with, and ultimately requires, realism.

This is a collection of articles which debate the merits of virtue-theoretic approaches to the core epistemological issues of knowledge and justified belief.

This treatment of the internalism-externalism debate in contemporary epistemology explores the implications for traditional sceptical concerns. It argues that when one understands these implications, it is possible to see the philosophical usefulness of a foundationalism relying on acquaintance.

This work originated in the deeply-felt conviction that the widespread acceptance of Gettier-type counterexamples to the classical definition of knowledge rests in a demonstrably erroneous understanding of the nature of human knowledge.

Contesting much contemporary epistemology and cognitive science, noted philosopher Kenneth M. Sayre argues that, while some cognitive attitudes such as believing take propositions as objects, there are many others (knowing, hoping, fearing, etc.) whose objects are instead states of affairs.

Modern epistemology has run into several paradoxes in its efforts to explain how knowledge acquisition can be both socially based (and thus apparently context-relative) and still able to determine objective facts about the world. In this book, Richmond Campbell attempts to dispel some of these paradoxes.

Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgements. This collection of essays covers how psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical enquiry.