Böcker i Studies in Ethics-serien

Moral Self-Regard draws on the work of Marcia Baron, Joseph Butler and Allen Wood, among others in this first extensive study of the nature, foundation and significance of duties to oneself in Kant's moral theory.

This work offers a new understanding of Kant on the freedom of the will. Essential reading for those interested in moral philosophy, Kant, philosophy of religion, philosophy of action and freedom of the will.

This is the first book length treatment of incomparability, value and practical reason, arguing that alternatives for choice, no matter how different, are never incomparable and that comparisons can be more various than is thought.

This book examines the relationship between normative ethical theories, particularly consequentialist ones, and personal relationships such as friendship.

The first extensive study of the nature, foundation and significance of duties to oneself in Immanuel Kant's moral theory.

Argues for 'Consensualism' as a plausible characterisation of commonsense reasoning, avoiding the conceptual pitfalls of both deontological moral theory and consequentialism.

Examines the significance of Kant's account of 'rational faith' for his mature moral philosophy.

First Published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book attempts to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed.

This book presents and argues for a suitably articulated version of consensualism as a form of Kantian moral theory with an ability to powerfully illuminate the moral intuitions to which Kantian and utilitarian theories have traditionally appealed.

Presents a sustained and original challenge to the orthodox understanding of the relationship between morality and voluntary choice. The two main theses of the book are that we can be morally responsible for aspects of our character that we have not chosen or otherwise authored, and that we can enter into interpersonal commitments to which we have not voluntarily consented.

First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.