Böcker i Wolverhampton Military Studies-serien

The book will show how counterinsurgency succeeds or fails at the local level (at the level of tactical decisions by small-unit leaders) and that these decisions cannot be successful without understanding the culture and perspective of those who live in TRMEs.

Since the late 1970s, anglophone and German military literature has been fascinated by the Wehrmacht's command system, especially the practice of Auftragstaktik. There have been many descriptions of the doctrine, and examinations of its historical origins, as well as unflattering comparisons with the approaches of the British and American armies prior to their adoption of Mission Command in the late 1980s. Almost none of these, however, have sought to understand the different approaches to command in the context of a fundamental characteristic of warfare - friction. This would be like trying to understand flight, without any reference to aerodynamics. Inherently flawed, yet this is the norm in the military literature.This book seeks to address that gap. First, the nature of friction, and the potential command responses to it, are considered. This allows the development of a typology of eight command approaches; each approach then being tested to identify its relative effectiveness and requirements for success. Second, the British and German armies' doctrines of command during the period are examined, in order to reveal similarities and differences in relation to their perspective on the nature of warfare and the most appropriate responses. The experience of Erwin Rommel, both as a young subaltern fighting the Italians in 1917, and then as a newly-appointed divisional commander against the French in 1940, is used to test the expression of the German doctrine in practice. Third, the interaction of these different command doctrines is explored in case studies of two key armored battles, Amiens in August 1918 and Arras in May 1940, allowing the strengths and weaknesses of each to be highlighted and the typology to be tested. The result is intended to offer a new and deeper understanding of both the nature of command as a response to friction, and the factors that need to be in place in order to allow a given command approach to achieve success. The book therefore in two ways represents a sequel to the author's earlier work, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Cass, 1995), in that it both takes the conceptual model of command developed there to a deeper level, and also takes the story from the climax of 1918 up to the end of the first phase of the Second World War.

Using a combination of new perspectives and new evidence, this book presents a reinterpretation of how 21st Army Group produced a successful combined arms doctrine by late 1944 and implemented this in early 1945.

Early Modern Systems of Command explores the lives these individuals led on campaign and the nature of the apparatus of command they formed. Drawing upon a wealth of primary material it examines topics as diverse as corruption, logistics, military justice and intelligence-gathering.

Between 1941 & 1945 the war in the Far East is occasionally referred to as the 'Forgotten War'. This book will analyse how the Allies lost air superiority during the initial exchanges, and then how technical and material difficulties were overcome before air superiority was won in 1944, and air supremacy was gained in 1945.

Public schoolboys in the Great War were part of a nation in arms. This book explains how their involvement was far more than romantic idealism.

Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson is one of the most controversial British officers of the Great War, condemned as much for what he wrote as for what he did. Making extensive use of primary sources, this new study sheds fresh light on Wilson's Great War career.

Challenges the commonly held view that the British Army ignored the American Civil War, and demonstrates how its equipment, tactics and strategy changed in response.

In this ground-breaking work, James Roberts examines the willingness and ability of British volunteer and conscript infantrymen of the Great War to perform the soldier's fundamental role: to kill or maim the enemy, and accept the attendant chance of being killed or wounded. Literature to date has been, paradoxically, somewhat silent on the soldier'

The author's compilation of a unique register identifying those individual South Wales miners who served in the tunneling companies has allowed a remarkable story to be told. For the first time, the lives of individual South Wales miners are highlighted from pre-war mining days: their very personal contribution within the tunneling companies, to the resting places of those who did not survive the war - and, for the survivors, their ultimate dispatch home. The underlying theme is of an indefatigable band of men, together with like-minded miners from other British coalfields, asked to carry out multi-tasked duties associated with a form of military mining not foreseen prior to the outbreak of war. Before a major battle, these men constructed large underground dugouts to house troops away from enemy shell fire. In exploding huge mines under German lines immediately before the British attack, they aided the advancing infantry in causing death and confusion in the German lines. During the British advance in 1918, they became experts in the dangerous work of defusing enemy booby-traps, delay-action and landmines in front of the advancing troops. They showed all the resolution, fortitude and determination - if not sheer bloody-mindedness - to see the job through; so reminiscent of the miner at home struggling to earn a decent rate of pay in the most arduous of conditions. There was a price to pay... Details are given of the 207 miners who died whilst on active service and of how many others were repatriated after gunshot wounds, gas poisoning or ill-health. Accounts are given of miners entombed underground as a result of enemy explosions; medals awarded for acts of bravery when attempting to free trapped miners; and of those taken as prisoners of war when the enemy broke into British workings. Old men and young boys lied about their ages to gain acceptance into the tunneling companies - and suffered the harsh consequences. A unique investigation such as this not only acknowledges the miners' personal contribution as tunnelers, but also serves as a scholarly and novel addition to the existing literature concerning the history of the Great War, its tunneling companies, South Wales, its coalfield and the lives of its miners. There can be little doubt that this work will, in years to come, establish itself as a standard text in the history of military mining not only in a specific sense, but also as a work on the Great War in general.

This is the first book devoted to the subject of reconnaissance in the nascent Tank Corps in the Great War. It is a neglected field in spite of passing references to reconnaissance in a number of early books on the history of the Tank Corps. This is also the first attempt to provide a conceptual framework in which to consider intelligence and reconnaissance work and to see it in the broader context of military reconnaissance. Adding the term 'Reconography' to the military lexicon draws attention to a little-known monograph on the subject which has never entered the popular domain before now. The introduction of the tanks on the Western Front in 1916 launched a new form of armored warfare. After their baptism on 15 September 1916, the tanks became dependent on a few reconnaissance officers to guide them into action. The importance of these officers was fully recognized within the Tank Corps itself, but less so outside. The reconnaissance officers came to form an elite group of talented men, a special caste, whose contribution to the nascent Tank Corps was far greater than their numbers might suggest. It is surprising, therefore, that the contribution made by these officers has hitherto been neglected in the historiography of British tank operations in the First World War. This book aims to appeal at a number of levels: it seeks to pull together the activities, skills and techniques of tank Intelligence and reconnaissance officers and assess their place and contribution to British tank operations in the Great War; it places tank reconnaissance work in the wider context of intelligence and reconnaissance activities prior to the war and it also provides a case study of the tensions that inevitably occur when new wine is put into old bottles, or more prosaically, new technology into existing organizations. It has been necessary to create conceptual structures in which reconnaissance operations can be analyzed; it attempts to breathe life into what some might regard as a dull technical subject by devoting space to key figures in Tank Corps' intelligence and reconnaissance activities. Fortunately, and perhaps as a consequence of their activities, they were some of the most colorful and interesting figures in the Tank Corps at that time. In awarding the author the WFA-Helion Holmes Prize, the judges concluded that 'his work reflects deep research, a high standard of writing and a notable originality'.

Towards a Wider War examines British policy, grand strategy, military operations and tactical execution in the critical period of the 'Phoney War' - culminating in Scandinavia and the forlorn campaign in Norway. Recognizing that political and military leaders rarely plan for failure, the work assesses the strengths and weaknesses of British performance in the last year of peace and during the first critical months of war. Fundamentally, major problems were evidenced across the spectrum of war, but perhaps the greatest failing demonstrated remained in the higher direction of war and the mismatch between avowed strategy and operational capability. Based on official and unofficial records - and a review of the existing secondary literature - Towards a Wider War offers a reasoned and balanced assessment of British war-making at the start of the Second World War. Following a summation of the actual experience of war, the work investigates and assesses the style and manner of Britain's higher direction of war and the effectiveness of each of the services at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war - as well as their abilities to cooperate in the joint environment. Along the way, fresh insight is offered into the centrality of economic warfare in British planning; the place of the War Cabinet in executing oversight of the war; and the workings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the role of the Joint Planning Committee. Of the services, the Royal Navy was most prepared for war in a European theatre in 1939. Force structure alone made this so, yet German aggression against Poland demonstrated the limitations of maritime power. Both the British Army and the Royal Air Force were undergoing major expansion programs when war arose and, for the former, it was thought three years would be required before deficiencies were alleviated. Sustaining public support during the interim was by no means assured - and in the background stood the necessity to avoid another bloodletting on the Western Front. These factors loomed large in London in late 1939 and that Italy - a presumed belligerent - had opted for neutrality painted initial strategic plans false. Increasingly, Britain (and France) looked to defeat Germany by removing her access to those commodities that made modern warfare possible: petroleum, iron ore and finance. That it increasingly appeared Nazi Germany was allied to Communist Russia only made the problem of making war more vexing. Towards a Wider War offers a unique single-volume analysis of British war-making at the pivotal beginning of the Second World War when all remained to be won -- or lost -- in the far north.

Between 1792 and 1945, the character of warfare changed. Battalions standing shoulder to shoulder during the Napoleonic era gave way to the industrialised, modern armies of the First and Second World Wars.

Before the first shots were fired at Gettysburg - for many, the most significant engagement of the American Civil War - a private battle had been raging for weeks. As the Confederate Army marched into Union territory, the Federal Forces desperately sought to hunt them down before they struck at any of the great cities of the North. Whoever could secure accurate information on their opponent would have a decisive advantage once the fighting started. When the two armies finally met on the morning of 1 July 1863 their understanding of the prevailing situation could not have been more different. While the Rebel Third Corps was expecting to brush away a group of local militia guarding the town, the Federal I Corps was preparing itself for a major battle. For three brutal days, the Rebel Army smashed at the Union troops, without success. The illustrious Confederate General Robert E. Lee would lose a third of his army and the tide of the rebellion would begin its retreat. Robert Lee himself would begin the argument on the contribution of military intelligence to his defeat by seeking to blame his cavalry. Generations of historians would debate into what factors played a decisive role, but no one has sought to explore the root of how the most able General of his era could have left himself so vulnerable at the climax of such a vital operation. Much Embarrassed investigates how the Confederate and Union military intelligence systems had been sculpted by the preceding events of the war and how this led to the final outcome of the Gettysburg Campaign. While the success of the Confederate strategy nurtured a fundamental flaw in their appreciation of intelligence, recurrent defeat led the Federal Army to develop one of the most advanced intelligence structures in history. Lee was right to highlight the importance of military intelligence to his failure at Gettysburg, but he would never appreciate that the seeds of his defeat had been sown long before.

"This book argues that the 8th Division, a war-raised formation made up of units recalled from overseas, became a much more effective and experienced organization by the war's end. it ruther argues that the formation did not use one solution to problems but adopted a sophisticated approach dependent on the tactical situation. This is supported by original sources including war diaries, after-action reports and the post-war correspondence with the British official historian. From its first acquainance with the peculiar nature of trench-warfare following its arrival in France in late 1914, 8th Division undertook a series of operations that attempted to break the deadlock ... by the "advance to victory" of late 1918, 8th Division was able to operate at a tempo far higher than it had achieved before. Unique selling points: first examination of the Division since the 1920s; gives the background to classic works such as General Jack's Diary and Sir John Baynes' Morale; shows that not all troops marched in lines on 1st July 1916; use of new tactics, especially in 1917-1918; e.g. "neutralsation" not "destruction."-- Page [i].

The Revd P.B. Tubby Clayton may lay claim to have been one of the most charismatic and influential Anglican priests of the twentieth century. This is a modern assessment of the career of this remarkable man, using his personal papers, family papers, Toc H archives and Church Archives. The life and times of Tubby Clayton encompass the most interesti

The evolution of British airborne warfare cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the technological development required to convert the detail contained in the doctrine and concept into operational reality. This is a detailed investigation of the British technological investment in an airborne capability and analyses whether the new techno

At a time when many books about the Great War of 1914-1918 are largely reiterations of earlier strictly chronological accounts, wherein not much is new except perhaps the author's style, it is refreshing, even exciting, when a book offering new vistas comes along. Such a book is this one.

The Anglican chaplains who served in the Great War were changed by their experience of total war. They returned determined to revitalize the Anglican Church in Britain and to create a society which would be a living memorial to the men who had died. The chaplains who served in the army returned to a wide variety of church posts, bringing with them their experiences and expectations. They were to serve as parish priests, in cathedral chapters, teaching in schools and universities, as chaplains in prisons and hospitals and as full time workers for national institutions such as Toc H and the Industrial Christian Fellowship. A substantial number were destined to achieve positions of significant influence as bishops, deans, chaplains to the King and to be instrumental in matters concerning the influence of the church in industrial and political issues. These chaplains will be shown to have had an influence on Prayer Book revision, developments in theological thinking, moves towards church unity as well as having an important part to play in the resolving of industrial tension. Changes in society such as new divorce laws, the acceptance of contraception, and the responsible use of new media were aspects of the inter-war years which former chaplains were to involve themselves in. They were also influential in shaping attitudes to rituals of remembrance in the 1920s and attitudes to pacifism in the 1930s. Given the changes that occurred in the Church of England, institutionally, liturgically and in its attitudes to a rapidly changing society, it is important that the role of former chaplains should be examined and their significance analyzed. This book argues that in the inter-war years the impact of former chaplains was enhanced by their experiences in an unprecedented global conflict, which gave their actions and opinions more moral authority than would otherwise been the case. This question of the impact of former chaplains is considered in the context of debates about the effect that the war had on British society as a whole and on the Church of England In particular. The inter-war years have been described as "the long peace". As the former chaplains were coming to terms with the way in which the Great War had affected their lives and ministries the threat of the next war loomed. In the twenty years after their wartime chaplaincies, former chaplains had gone some way to fulfilling the hopes and aspirations articulated on their return from the front and could claim to have contributed greatly to both developments in the Anglican Church and in wider society.

Following the 1952 reorganization of the Portuguese Air Force from the army and naval air arms, Portugal now had an entity dedicated solely to aviation that would bring it into line with its new NATO commitment. As it proceeded to develop a competence in modern multiengine and jet fighter aircraft for its NATO role and train a professional corps of pilots, it was suddenly confronted in 1961 with fighting insurgencies in all three of its African possessions. This development forced it to acquire an entirely new and separate air force, the African air force, to address this emerging danger. This is the story of just how Portuguese leadership anticipated and dealt with this threat, and how it assembled an air force from scratch to meet it. The aircraft available at the time were largely castoffs from the larger, richer, and more sophisticated air forces of its NATO partners and not designed for counterinsurgency. Yet Portugal adapted them to the task and effectively crafted the appropriate strategies and tactics for their successful employment. The book explores the vicissitudes of procurement, an exercise fraught with anti-colonial political undercurrents, the imaginative modification and adaptation of the aircraft to fight in the African theaters, and the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for their effective employment against an elusive, clever, and dangerous enemy. Advances in weaponry, such as the helicopter gun ship, were the outgrowth of combat needs. The acquired logistic competences assured that the needed fuel types and lubricants, spare parts, and qualified maintenance personnel were available in even the most remote African landing sites. The advanced flying skills, such as visual reconnaissance and air-ground coordinated fire support, were honed and perfected. All of these aspects and more are explored and hold lessons in the application of airpower in any insurgency today.

Generally conceded to be doomed from the outset by the most recent historiography, the Gallipoli campaign still arouses heated controversy. In a new compendium of original research by an impressive array of established and up-and-coming scholars, Gallipoli: The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force 1915-16 explores a wide variety of aspects of the Alli

The First World War showed the vital importance of oil. The use of oil-fuelled aircraft, tanks, motor vehicles - and especially warships - increased greatly during the war. Britain and its allies found themselves in an oil crisis in 1917, but it was overcome (with difficulty) and the Allies' greater oil resources - mostly supplied by the USA - cont

This work seeks to address the notion of German numerical-weakness in terms of Germany's ability to replace its losses and regenerate its military strength, and assess just how accurate this argument was during the crucial first half of the Russo-German War (June 1941-June 1943).