Böcker av Air University Press

Colonel Cox examines the command of Lt Gen George H. Brett in his wartime assignments. General Brett's leadership did not take him to four stars, why? Cox looks at the reasons why he was not promoted, especially, as he began his war time service second in command to Gen Henry "Hap" Arnold. In his examination, first published in 2004, Cox shows the reader Brett's outstanding leadership, his limitations, and delves into the interplay of broader factors that ultimately impacted General Brett's career. This book provides insight toward becoming an effective commander and leader.

More than a tool of policy makers to gather intelligence, Air Force reconnaissance efforts shaped early Cold War doctrine and war planning. Dr. Farquhar argues that a lack of information on Soviet strategic capabilities dominated the organization, operational planning, and equipment of the postwar Air Force. To support his assertion, Farquhar traces the development of aerial reconnaissance from the first balloon ascents through World War II as a prelude. He then examines early Cold War peripheral reconnaissance and overflights of the Soviet Union. He explains the evolution of intelligence-gathering technology, bureaucratic growth, and a relative lack of attention paid to electronic warfare before the Korean War. Based primarily on archival sources, this book (first published in 2004) serves as an excellent reference for air doctrine, intelligence, and electronic warfare in the formative years of the Cold War.

Originally published in 1999. Colonel Williams presents a comprehensive study of British bombing efforts in the Great War. He contends that the official version of costs and results underplays the costs while overplaying the results. Supported by postwar findings of both US and British evaluation teams, he argues that British bombing efforts were significantly less effective than heretofore believed. Colonel Williams also presents a strong argument that German air defenses caused considerably less damage to British forces than pilot error, malfunctioning aircraft, and bad weather. That we believed otherwise supports the notion that British bombing raids had forced Germany to transfer significant air assets to defend against them. Williams, however, found no evidence that any such transfer occurred. Actual results, Colonel Williams argues, stand in strong contrast to claimed results.

The US National Space Policy released by the president in 2006 states that the US government should "develop space professionals." As an integral part of that endeavor, "AU-18, Space Primer", provides to the joint war fighter an unclassified resource for understanding the capabilities, organizations, and operations of space forces. This primer is a useful tool both for individuals who are not "space aware"-unacquainted with space capabilities, organizations, and operations-and for those who are "space aware," especially individuals associated with the space community, but not familiar with space capabilities, organizations, and operations outside their particular areas of expertise. It is your guide and your invitation to all the excitement and opportunity of space.Last published in 1993, this updated version of the Space Primer has been made possible by combined efforts of the Air Command and Staff College's academic year 2008 "Jointspacemindedness" and "Operational Space" research seminars, as well as select members of the academic year 2009 "Advanced Space" research seminar.