Böcker av Boris Sokolov

_Operation Bagration_ analyses the great Russian offensive in Belorussia in the summer of 1944 covering the planning of the operation as well as the German plans of the summer campaign of 1944\. In depth research sets out to determine the real ratio of the Soviet and German forces as well as their actual losses during the operation. As well as some good decisions, command on both sides made some crucial mistakes as well as main tactical errors all of which are studied in this book to produce a fully rounded view of the campaign and highlights a connection to Operation Overlord by proving that it was only due to the landing at Normandy that the Soviet forces were able to destroy the German Army Group Centre while the elite mobile forces were concentrated in France.

This book provides a comprehensive overview of recent developments in network dynamics and control with applications to supply chains, manufacturing and logistics systems. It systemizes these developments in the form of new taxonomies and methodological principles to shape the research domain of supply network dynamics control. Uniquely, the book links the fundamentals of control and system theories and artificial intelligence with supply chain and operations management. It addresses the needs of researchers and practitioners alike, revealing the challenges and opportunities of supply chain and operations management by means of dynamic system analysis.

This book investigates several controversial issues regarding the role of the Soviet Union and the performance of the Soviet government and Red Army, to which the author provides some provocative answers. The primary question explored by the author, however, regards the effectiveness of both the Red Army and of the Soviet military economy. Dr. Sokolov argues that the chief defect of the Soviet military economy was the disproportionate emphasis on the production of tanks and aircraft at the expense of transportation means and the means of command and control. This leads the author to look at the role of Lend-Lease during the war. Through the delivery of radio sets, trucks, jeeps, locomotives, fuel, explosives and so on, the author concludes that Lend-Lease was critical to the Red Army, and that the Soviet Union would not have been able to wage a long war against Germany without the Lend-Lease supplies - a conclusion that defies decades of Soviet claims to the contrary. Finally, the author looks at the still very controversial and hot topic of Red Army losses in the war, which was taboo for decades, arguing that this is an effective measure of the Red Army's military performance. He and other scholars have estimated that the Red Army's losses were on the scale of 27 million, three times larger than the official estimates, and approximately 10 times greater than the German losses on the Eastern Front. He argues that such horrendous casualties and such an unfavorable ratio for the Red Army were the result of the relatively low value placed on human life in both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and the much more destructive nature of the Soviet totalitarian regime as compared with the Third Reich, which cowed the Soviet generals and officers into total subservience. Due to the elimination of all political opposition and the total control over people's lives, soldiers and civilians could not protest against the crude tactics that resulted in such a very high rate of losses.

A thought-provoking reassessment of key aspects of the Second World War on the Eastern Front by a leading Russian historian.