Galen Strawson argues for a comprehensive account of metaphysical categories, in defence of categorial monism, the view that there's only one fundamental metaphysical category. Stuff, Quality, Structure also provides a treatment of the notion of structure, arguing that structure cannot be fundamental.
Does the self exist? If so, what is its nature? How long do selves last? Galen Strawson draws on literature and psychology as well as philosophy to discuss various ways we experience having or being a self. He argues that it is legitimate to say that there is such a thing as the self, distinct from the human being.
An argument against neobehaviorism and for "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples a wholly materialist approach to the mind with a fully realist attitude to the phenomena of conscious experience.
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