Böcker av Jing Chen

这本儿童着色书有22+可爱的熊猫，大熊猫，竹子树和更多的儿童，幼儿和学龄前儿童的着色和活动页。通过这个，孩子们可以在几个小时内涂色并获得乐趣，这些活动将使你的孩子在放松的同时得到娱乐。这些页面是以儿童友好、有趣的风格绘制的，孩子们会喜欢。这本书是一个完美的无数字屏幕活动，可以提高孩子的创造力和想象力。关于这本涂色书。从易到难的插图。22+神奇的插图。45页。带有标准8.5 "x11 "框架的艺术作品。高质量、漂亮的封面。本书中没有重复的图片。本书是单面的，以防止渗漏。适用于涂色笔、铅笔、马克笔和蜡笔等。最好的纸张质量。适合所有年龄的人。

This book highlights reliable, valid and practical testing and assessment of interpreting, presenting important developments in China, where testing and assessment have long been a major concern for interpreting educators and researchers, but have remained largely under-reported. The book not only offers theoretical insights into potential issues and problems undermining interpreting assessment, but also describes useful measurement models to address such concerns. Showcasing the latest Chinese research to create rubrics-referenced rating scales, enhance formative assessment practice, and explore (semi-)automated assessment, the book is a valuable resource for educators, trainers and researchers, enabling to gain a better understanding of interpreting testing and assessment as both a worthwhile endeavor and a promising research area.

The mathematical theory enables us to systematically measure the effectiveness of different policies and institutional structures at varying levels of resource abundance and cost.The theory presented in this book shows that there do not exist universally optimal policies or institutional structures.

This book develops an informational theory to account for the coexistence of China's exceptionally resilient authoritarianism and its high decentralization. The nuanced information contained in citizens' complaints, which are filed through the petition system, helps to sustain China's decentralized authoritarianism in three important ways. First, petitions help to alleviate the information asymmetry problem that arises when the central government has less information than lower level governments do. When studying citizens' petitions, higher level governments can obtain valuable and accurate information about local officials' performance in policy implementation, public goods provision, and corruption. Higher level governments need this information in order to effectively utilize the cadre management system to reward good performance and punish malpractice. The result of this interaction is the PRC's relatively high quality of governance and effective control of local officials. There is also a second way in which citizens' petitions help the government to overcome the dictator's dilemma that arises when an authoritarian regime is uncertain about how much support it really enjoys among its citizens. Citizens' specific grievances are revealed in these petitions and are mostly addressed in their beginning stages. When citizens' complaints are rooted in central policy, they set the agenda for policy change in order to maintain social order. There is yet a third benefit conferred upon the PRC by the petition system. Thanks to the petition system, the central government can present itself as the ally of citizens when it addresses the matters raised by their petitions. As a result, the petition system grants the central government an opportunity to hold local officials accountable, scapegoat local authorities, divide citizens and local officials, and justly claim all the credit when its policies succeed. This helps to build citizens' trust in their central government and reinforces its legitimacy in their eyes. In Huntington's terms, the Chinese Communist Party institutionalizes mass support by addressing citizens' grievances expressed through the channel of communication provided by the petition system. In this sense, the complaints of citizens can be very useful tools for regime maintenance. The author substantiates these points with case studies and statistical analysis.