The set of possible outcomes in the process of government formation is then calculated on the basis of both the fuzzy Pareto set and the fuzzy maximal set, and the predictions are compared with those made by two conventional approaches as well as with the government that was actually formed.
This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the social choice literature and shows, by applying fuzzy sets, how the use of fuzzy preferences, rather than that of strict ones, may affect the social choice theorems. Moreover, the median voter theorem is shown to hold under strict fuzzy preferences but not under weak fuzzy preferences.
This book presents mathematical techniques for modeling complex cases such as scarcity of data points, or unrepeatable experiments, and applies these to nuclear deterrence, political stability and even issues involving deaf and hard of hearing children.
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