Böcker av Robert B. Pippin

Hegel frequently claimed that the heart of his entire system was a book widely regarded as among the most difficult in the history of philosophy, The Science of Logic. This is the book that presents his metaphysics, an enterprise that he insists can only be properly understood as a "logic," or a "science of pure thinking." Since he also wrote that the proper object of any such logic is pure thinking itself, it has always been unclear in just what sense such a science could be a "metaphysics." Robert B. Pippin offers here a bold, original interpretation of Hegel's claim that only now, after Kant's critical breakthrough in philosophy, can we understand how logic can be a metaphysics. Pippin addresses Hegel's deep, constant reliance on Aristotle's conception of metaphysics, the difference between Hegel's project and modern rationalist metaphysics, and the links between the "logic as metaphysics" claim and modern developments in the philosophy of logic. Pippin goes on to explore many other facets of Hegel's thought, including the significance for a philosophical logic of the self-conscious character of thought, the dynamism of reason in Kant and Hegel, life as a logical category, and what Hegel might mean by the unity of the idea of the true and the idea of the good in the "Absolute Idea." The culmination of Pippin's work on Hegel and German idealism, this is a book that no Hegel scholar or historian of philosophy will want to miss.

Offers an argument that the study of historical figures is not only an interpretation of their views, but can be understood as a form of philosophy itself. Examining a number of philosophers to explore the nature of this interanimation, this book presents an assortment of thoughtful examples of historical commentary that enact philosophy.

In his Berlin lectures on fine art, Hegel argued that art involves a unique form of aesthetic intelligibility - the expression of a distinct collective self-understanding that develops through historical time. This title offers a sophisticated exploration of Hegel's position.

Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the most elusive thinkers in the philosophical tradition. Nonetheless, certain readings of his work have become standard and influential. This title challenges various traditional views, taking the philosopher at his word when he says that his writing can best be understood as a kind of psychology.

In the most influential chapter of his most important philosophical work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel makes the central and disarming assertions that "e;self-consciousness is desire itself"e; and that it attains its "e;satisfaction"e; only in another self-consciousness. Hegel on Self-Consciousness presents a groundbreaking new interpretation of these revolutionary claims, tracing their roots to Kant's philosophy and demonstrating their continued relevance for contemporary thought. As Robert Pippin shows, Hegel argues that we must understand Kant's account of the self-conscious nature of consciousness as a claim in practical philosophy, and that therefore we need radically different views of human sentience, the conditions of our knowledge of the world, and the social nature of subjectivity and normativity. Pippin explains why this chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology should be seen as the basis of much later continental philosophy and the Marxist, neo-Marxist, and critical-theory traditions. He also contrasts his own interpretation of Hegel's assertions with influential interpretations of the chapter put forward by philosophers John McDowell and Robert Brandom.

Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, 2e presents a new interpretation of the negative and critical self--understanding characteristic of much European high culture since romanticism and especially since Nietzsche, and answers the question of why the issue of modernity became a philosophical problem in European tradition.

This is the most important book on Hegel to have appeared in the past ten years. Robert Pippin offers a completely new interpretation of Hegel's idealism, which focuses on Hegel's appropriation and development of kant's theoretical project. Hegel is presented neither as a precritical metaphysician nor as a social theorist, but as a critical philosopher whose disagreements with Kant, especially on the issue of intuitions, enrich the idealist arguments against empiricism, realism and naturalism. In the face of the dismissal of absolute idealism as either unintelligible or implausible, Pippin explains and defends an original account of the philosophical basis for Hegel's claims about the historical and social nature of selfconsciousness, and so of knowledge itself.