Böcker av Strategic Studies Institute

Looking out to 2025, many see potential for a prolonged period of instability as a result of competing economic models, demographics, the rise of new international actors and the resurgence of old ones, climate change, and the scarcity of resources. The range of stability challenges will stretch the capabilities of any military force structure and require innovative thinking concerning the appropriate development and use of the military element of power. In this anthology, sixteen students of the United States Army War College Class of 2008 offer their perspectives on the use of military power across the spectrum of conflict in the 21st century, short of or following general war; they provide insights into the necessary force structure, policy, strategy, and doctrinal approaches for future success. The first chapter describes the security dilemma confronting the United States and the implications for military force structure and operations. It argues that full spectrum operations are an appropriate doctrinal response, and that stability operations will present new challenges for the use of military force. The subsequent chapters are edited student research papers from the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 selected for their focus on operations short of general war. Each writing shares in common a worthwhile idea or set of ideas that can materially contribute to how the United States military can best conduct full spectrum operations. Collectively, these essays reveal the innovative thinking, diversity, and depth of thought that is characteristic of the U.S. and foreign military and civilian personnel that comprise each class of the U.S. Army War College. The essays also offer key insights at the policy, strategy, planning, and doctrinal levels that can be applied in the current and future strategic environments confronting the United States and its security partners

Dr. Williams identifies the roots of organized crime in post-Ba'athist Iraq in an authoritarian and corrupt state dominated by Saddam Hussein and subject to international sanctions. He also explains the rise of organized crime after the U.S. invasion in terms of two distinct waves: the first wave followed the collapse of the state and was accompanied by the breakdown of social control mechanisms and the development of anomie; the second wave was driven by anarchy, insecurity, political ambition, and the imperatives of resource generation for militias, insurgents, and other groups. This monograph looks in detail at major criminal activities, including the theft, diversion, and smuggling of oil, the kidnapping of both Iraqis and foreigners, extortion, car theft, and the theft and smuggling of antiquities. The author also considers the critical role played by corruption in facilitating and strengthening organized crime. He shows how al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jaish-al-Mahdi, and the Sunni tribes used criminal activities to fund their campaigns of political violence. Dr. Williams also identifies necessary responses to organized crime and corruption in Iraq, including efforts to reduce criminal opportunities, change incentive structures, and more directly target criminal organizations and activities.

Mary Fitzgerald made many contributions to the national security field over the course of the years through her close reading of the writing of Soviet and Russian military officers. Particularly useful was her focus on those of Soviet military theorists who put forward forecasts of future warfare and the impact of technology on warfare. These Russian reviews deserved respect and study; Mary's work made this possible. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became easier to meet with and talk with a number to these Soviet officers so as to explore more fully their thinking and the continuing development of their ideas about future warfare, and the likely direction of the military revolution they had begun writing about in the late 1970s. Organizing meetings with them was greatly aided by Mary because of the good relations she had developed with several of these officers, who liked her as a person and were flattered that she had been so careful a readers of their writings.

No subject is more essential in the preparation of national security professionals and military leaders than the teaching of strategy, from grand to military strategy. Nor is there one that is more timeless and intellectually demanding. Moreover, the experience of the armed forces in recent wars recommends that the system of military education needs to conduct a serious analysis of the way strategy is taught. The task is even more imperative because the ambiguous conflicts and the complex geopolitical environment of the future are likely to challenge the community of strategists, civilian as well as military, in ways not seen in the past. In this context, developing the appropriate curriculum and effective methods of teaching strategy will be the responsibility of universities, colleges, and institutions of professional military education. The authors of this compendium ask and answer the central question of how to teach strategy.