Böcker utgivna av US Naval Institute Press

From October 1864 to November 1865, the officers of the CSS Shenandoah carried the Confederacy and the conflict of the Civil War around the globe through extreme weather, alien surroundings, and the people they encountered. Her officers were the descendants of Deep South plantation aristocracy and Old Dominion first families: a nephew of Robert E. Lee, a grandnephew of founder George Mason, and descendants of one of George Washington's generals and of an aid to Washington. One was even an uncle of a young Theodore Roosevelt and another was son-in-law to Raphael Semmes. Shenandoah's mission-commerce raiding (guerre de course)-was a central component of U.S. naval and maritime heritage, a profitable business, and a watery form of guerrilla warfare. These Americans stood in defense of their country as they understood it, pursuing a difficult and dangerous mission in which they succeeded spectacularly after it no longer mattered. This is a biography of a ship and a cruise, and a microcosm of the Confederate-American experience.

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike.On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed.

The radically new homeland security, military, and legal strategies developed by the United States in the months following the terrorists attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are given comprehensive treatment in this book by a former senior Pentagon official, combat veteran, and criminal prosecutor. Stephen M. Duncan draws on a lifetime of military and legal experience to examine the many questions relating to the role of the armed forces in homeland security, including elements of constitutional and criminal law, foreign policy, tradition and custom, federal-state and inter-agency relations, and politics, as well as military strategy and operations. Among the diverse subjects the author discusses are military tribunals and the International Criminal Court, the statute governing the use of military personnel in law enforcement, defense transformation, the constitutional power of the president, and the reorganization of the government to meet the terrorist threat. Duncan also discusses the strategy and tactics used in Afghanistan and Iraq and critically evaluates the nation's political leadership before and after the 9/11 attacks. His book gives readers access to a wealth of information essential to an understanding of the full picture and at the same time puts them in the midst of policy debates to grasp the immediacy of the situation. This important and absorbing historical narrative will attract general readers as well as those with experience in national security issues, politics, and the law.

Most Americans regard the postwar Occupation of Japan as a prime example of American magnanimity. They are blithely unaware of the prevailing Japanese myth that upon entering Japan, U.S. servicemen “engaged in an orgy of looting, sexual violence, and drunken brawling” and that during the first ten days of the Occupation there were 1,336 reported cases of rape in Kanagawa Prefecture alone. The myth goes further with claims that U.S. military officers demanded the Japanese government set up brothels for use by American troops and that when embarrassed officials in Washington, D.C., forced Occupation officials to close the brothels, the servicemembers went on a rampage, resulting in (according to official records) reported rapes of Japanese women skyrocketing from an average of 40 to 330 cases a day.     The truth is that none of this happened. Nevertheless, large numbers of Japanese still believe these allegations. As the passions of war have faded, the currency of such stories has only grown, and they are now regarded by many as fact. This false narrative of mass sexual violence and the organized exploitation of Japanese women by American military forces is also widely accepted among historians of World War II and its aftermath.     Brian P. Walsh, a Princeton-educated scholar, thoroughly debunks this false narrative in a brave and compelling book that reflects his in-depth research into both American and Japanese primary sources. Historian Ed Drea has praised Walsh’s work on this topic as a “masterful refutation of perceived wisdom. It is original historical research and writing at its best and is a significant contribution to the study of sexual violence in a military context and to the U.S. occupation of Japan.”    Walsh sets the records straight, by showing that MacArthur’s General Headquarters established women’s rights on a more secure foundation than anywhere else in East Asia, provided a far safer physical environment than most other occupations, and all but eliminated endemic sexually transmitted diseases. These diseases ruined millions of lives, prematurely ending as many as five thousand per year, including those of more than a thousand children. The “Rape” of Japan is a long-overdue refutation and exposure of a relentless propaganda campaign that has persisted for more than seven decades.

"When Lt. Cdr. Waldo Drake, USNR arrived in Pearl Harbor in June 1941 as the U.S. Pacific Fleet's first Public Relations Officer (PRO), he was an admired maritime reporter for the Los Angeles Times and Reserve Officer appointed to intelligence duties. By October 1944, he was hated by most of the correspondents assigned to cover the war against Japan and seen by officials in Washington as an obstacle to the development of Navy public relations. What led Drake to become the Pacific Fleet's first PRO, what happened during the three years he served on the CINCPAC staff, and why he was removed from that position are the focus of Nimitz's Newsman: Waldo Drake and the Navy's Censored War in the Pacific. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Adm. Chester Nimitz, USN assumed command of the Pacific Fleet and inherited Drake's services. Drake became responsible for informing America's press about the Pacific Fleet's wartime role and thus gained an outsized ability to influence American public opinion. The Navy's decision to allow public relations officers to censor press copy caused numerous conflicts between Drake and the correspondents assigned to the Fleet. It was Drake's love for the Navy, his tendency to take on every job himself, and above all his close relationship with Adm. Nimitz that allowed him to perform censorship duties with approval. Drake's protection of Nimitz, and his reticence to give the press any information that could endanger operational security or dampen morale, caused Navy victories to go under-reported-much to the consternation of officials in Washington. In analyzing the dynamics of Drake and Nimitz's relationship, and in highlighting Drake's interactions with correspondents and Navy officials, Nimitz's Newsman reveals the inside story of the Navy's censored war in the Pacific during World War II. "--

"The United States is in the midst of a new cold war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and America is losing. That claim, at the core of Michael Sobolik's new book Countering China's Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance, challenges the Washington, D.C. conventional wisdom about U.S.-China relations. Officials in Washington are reacting to the CCP and playing defense. Like America's efforts to contain the Soviet Union in the twentieth-century Cold War, the United States needs a strategic vision to overcome the CCP. Sobolik offers a plan for American victory over the CCP and presents a roadmap to sabotage the crux of the CCP's foreign policy: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At its core, the BRI is not an economic venture. It is a geopolitical gambit. Chinese leader Xi Jinping's "project of the century" has entered its second phase: leveraging yesterday's investments for today's political and military ends. Xi will never do away with the BRI because it is strengthening Beijing's strategic position from Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands to Africa and Latin America. The BRI is the apotheosis of the CCP's grand strategy. America needs a blueprint to take it down. Sobolik provides this blueprint by identifying the BRI's core weakness: imperial overstretch. After identifying China's penchant for empire-building, he identifies the BRI's key weaknesses globally and traces them back to the CCP's vulnerabilities at home. Sobolik's work offers policymakers a plan to go on the offense and win America's new cold war"--

"With updates to every chapter, this new fourth edition serves as the premier guide to professional writing for the naval services. Authored by a naval officer who taught English at two service academies, the book is widely used by officers, enlisted men and women and civilians in both the Navy and Marine Corps. Shenk provides sound, practical advice on all common naval writing assignments across digital and print platforms. Fully revised, the book reflects the changing landscape of professional communication in general and changes in naval culture in the last decade across the fleet, making it an essential guide"--

"This book provides readers with an in-depth understanding of the professional development of two notable and highly accomplished naval officers and their contributions to the development of the Aegis Weapons System. The main argument is that there was no single career path or set of formal qualifications for achieving excellence in the naval profession as characterized by selection for Flag rank. One of the major points is the revelation that a combination of essential personal traits and qualities and important operational and technical experiences fundamental to the nature of naval warfare are critical to developing highly competent and confident officers. Such officers are needed to lead major acquisition programs capable of delivering innovative weapons systems for a twenty-first century Navy facing new age threats"--

The second edition of Sea Power presents a complete history of the world's navies from antiquity to the present. From the opening chapter on galley warfare, through a section on Japanese naval history, to the rise and decline of the British navy and the rise and temporary decline of the American navy, readers will find a broad and colorful tapestry woven by respected naval historians.The book focuses on the influences of sea power upon history as well as on naval operations - strategy, tactics, and logistics. It gives due consideration to changes in naval weapons and the administrative reforms brought about because of them. Sea Power is a lively history in which the personalities that shaped events stand out as sharply as the events themselves.

"It is unclear if U.S. policy makers and military leaders fully realize that we have already been thrust into an artificial intelligence (AI) race with authoritarian powers. Today, the United States' peer adversaries-China and Russia-have made clear their intentions to make major investments in AI and insert this technology into their military systems, sensors and weapons. Their goal is to gain an asymmetric advantage over the U.S. military. The implications for our national security are many and complex. Algorithms of Armageddon examines this most pressing security issue in a clear, insightful delivery by two experts. Authors George Galdorisi and Sam J. Tangredi are national security professionals who deal with AI on a day-to-day basis in their work in both the technical and policy arenas. Opening chapters explain the fundamentals of what constitutes big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. They investigate the convergence of AI with other technologies and how these systems will interact with humans. Critical to the issue is the manner by which AI is being developed and utilized by Russia and China. The central chapters of the work address the weaponizing of AI through interaction with other technologies, man-machine teaming, and autonomous weapons systems. The authors cover in depth debates surrounding the AI "genie out of the bottle" controversy, AI arms races, and the resulting impact on policy and the laws of war. Given that global powers are leading large-scale development of AI, it is likely that use of this technology will be global in extent. Will AI-enabled military weapons systems lead to full-scale global war? Can such a conflict be avoided? The later chapters of the work explore these questions, point to the possibility of humans failing to control military AI applications, and conclude that the dangers for the United States are real. Neither a protest against AI, nor a speculative work on how AI could replace humans, Algorithms of Armageddon provides a time-critical understanding of why AI is being implemented through state weaponization, the realities for the global power balance, and more importantly, U.S. national security. Galdorisi and Tangredi propose a national dialogue that focuses on the need for U.S. military to have access to the latest AI-enabled technology in order to provide security and prosperity to the American people"--

The Neptune Factor is the biography of an idea-the concept of "Sea Power,"¿a term first coined by Capt. A.T. Mahan and the core thread of his life's work. His central argument was that the outcome of rivalries on the seas have decisively shaped the course of modern history. Although Mahan's scholarship has long been seen as foundational to all systematic study of naval power, Neptune Factor is the first attempt to explain how Mahan's definition of sea power shifted over time.Far from presenting sea power in terms of combat, as often thought, Mahan conceptualized it in terms of economics. Proceeding from the conviction that international trade carried across the world's oceans was the single greatest driver of national wealth (and thus power) in history, Mahan explained sea power in terms of regulating access to 'the common' and influencing the flows of trans-oceanic trade. A nation possessing sea power could not only safeguard its own trade and that of its allies but might also endeavor to deny access to the common to its enemies and competitors.A pioneering student of what is now referred to as the first era of globalization, lasting from the late nineteenth century until the First World War, Mahan also identified the growing dependence of national economies upon uninterrupted access to an interconnected global trading system. Put simply, access to 'the common' was essential to the economic and political stability of advanced societies. This growing dependence, Mahan thought, increased rather than decreased the potency of sea power.Understanding the critical relationship between navies and international economics is not the only reason why Mahan's ideas remain-or rather have once again become-so important. He wrote in, and of, a multi-polar world, when the reigning hegemon faced new challenges, and confusion and uncertainty reigned as the result of rapid technological change and profound social upheaval. Mahan believed that the U.S. Navy owed the American people a compelling explanation of why it deserved their support-and their money. His extensive, deeply informed, and highly sophisticated body of work on sea power constituted his attempt to supply such an explanation. Mahan remains as relevant-and needed-today as he was more than a century ago.

In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China's turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China's potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China's maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China's history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China's current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China's past as it relates to threats to the country's internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.

Justice at the Margins of War fills two important gaps in the literature on the ethics of national security affairs. First, while thinking about the justice of warfare is highly developed, justifications of intelligence activities--which can involve lying, manipulation, coercion, stealing and even killing to obtain and defend information--are relatively limited and often conflicting. The authors explore relevant ethical principles and then apply them to specific activities--including agent recruitment, human and technical methods of espionage and counterintelligence, interrogational torture, analysis, covert action, sabotage, and assassination. Second, ethical work on interstate conflict occurring in a "gray zone" between war and peace has only just begun. Gray zone operations--the use of low-level lethal and sublethal means to weaken others--are not new. But technological developments have increased the forms, intensity, and significance of this realm of competition. This volume defines the gray zone and discusses moral challenges associated with various operations--including lethal, economic, information, election, legal, and cyber.

Xi Jinping has made his ambitions for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) perfectly clear, there is no mystery what he wants, first, that China should become a “great maritime power“ and secondly, that the PLA “become a world-class armed force by 2050.“ He wants this latter objective to be largely completed by 2035. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power focuses on China's navy and how it is being transformed to satisfy the “world class“ goal. Beginning with an exploration of why China is seeking to become such a major maritime power, author Michael McDevitt first explores the strategic rationale behind Xi's two objectives. China's reliance on foreign trade and overseas interests such as China's Belt and Road strategy. In turn this has created concerns within the senior levels of China's military about the vulnerability of its overseas interests and maritime life-lines. is a major theme. McDevitt dubs this China's “sea lane anxiety“ and traces how this has required the PLA Navy to evolve from a “near seas“-focused navy to one that has global reach; a “blue water navy.“ He details how quickly this transformation has taken place, thanks to a patient step-by-step approach and abundant funding. The more than 10 years of anti-piracy patrols in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean has acted as a learning curve accelerator to “blue water“ status. McDevitt then explores the PLA Navy's role in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He provides a detailed assessment of what the PLAN will be expected to do if Beijing chooses to attack Taiwan potentially triggering combat with America's “first responders“ in East Asia, especially the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force. He conducts a close exploration of how the PLA Navy fits into China's campaign plan aimed at keeping reinforcing U.S. forces at arm's length (what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area denial [A2/AD]) if war has broken out over Taiwan, or because of attacks on U.S. allies and friends that live in the shadow of China. McDevitt does not know how Xi defines “world class“ but the evidence from the past 15 years of building a blue water force has already made the PLA Navy the second largest globally capable navy in the world. This book concludes with a forecast of what Xi's vision of a “world-class navy“ might look like in the next fifteen years when the 2035 deadline is reached.

Award-winning author Edward S. Miller contends in this work that the United States forced Japan into international bankruptcy to deter its aggression. While researching newly declassified records of the Treasury and Federal Reserve, Miller, a retired chief financial executive of a Fortune 500 resources corporation, uncovered just how much money mattered. Washington experts confidently predicted that the war in China would bankrupt Japan, not knowing that the Japanese government had a huge cache of dollars fraudulently hidden in New York. Once discovered, Japan scrambled to extract the money. But, Miller explains, in July 1941 President Roosevelt invoked a long-forgotten clause of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to freeze Japan's dollars and forbade it to sell its hoard of gold to the U.S. Treasury, the only open gold market after 1939. Roosevelt's temporary gambit to bring Japan to its senses, not its knees, was thwarted, however, by opportunistic bureaucrats. Dean Acheson, his handpicked administrator, slyly maneuvered to deny Japan the dollars needed to buy oil and other resources for war and for economic survival. Miller's lucid writing and thorough understanding of the complexities of international finance enable readers unfamiliar with financial concepts and terminology to grasp his explanation of the impact of U.S. economic policies on Japan. His review of thirty-seven studies of Japan's resource deficiencies begs the question of why no U.S. agency calculated the impact of the freeze on Japan's overall economy. His analysis of a massive OSS-State Department study of prewar Japan clearly demonstrates that the deprivations facing the Japanese people were the country to remain in financial limbo buttressed its choice of war at Pearl Harbor. Such a well-documented study is certain to be recognized for its significant contributions to the historiography of the origins of the Pacific War.