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Relatively little has been written about the role of the United States Revenue Marine Service (now the U.S. Coast Guard) in the naval struggle against the Confederacy. "The United States Revenue Cutters of the Civil War" presents a ship-by-ship study of this neglected aspect of the war.

Originally published in 1972, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

December 7, 1941, was by an assessment a devastating day. The Hawaiian Air Force suffered a crippling blow, but the genesis of recovery and final victory over the enemy emerged in the valor of those who weathered the onslaught and fought back with everything they had. In the 50 years since then, the attack has become a faded memory for some and to many members of the younger generation just another moment in history. It deserves better understanding and commemoration, however, for this sudden, damaging strike on our forces marked the beginning of America's involvement in a terrible global war that was massive in scope and destruction. Literature on the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack that launched the United States into World War II is extensive. Japan's primary objective that day was to cripple the US Fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor, and the Navy's experience during the attack has been chronicled in detail. Control of the air over the island of Oahu was essential to the success of the attack, but documentation on Army Air Forces involvement has been sparse and often fragmented. Consequently, few people understand why the Hawaiian Air Force was so unprepared to accomplish its air defense mission or realize the extent of the damage and casualties it sustained on that "Day of Infamy." This book is an attempt to remedy that situation, and the events and actions of the US Army Air Forces on 7 December are told in this publication. In this writing several important question are addressed. Why was the Imperial Japanese Navy able to devastate the Hawaiian Air Force with little or no opposition? Why was the American air arm with over 200 aircraft, including long-range bombers, six radar stations, a trained ground observer unit, and extensive antiaircraft weapons units unable to perform its primary job of protecting the fleet? Why are all available aircraft unarmed and lined up like sitting ducks on the flight line at each base? Why were the radar stations shut down at 0700 on the morning of the attack? Where was the central fighter control unit, and why was it not activated prior to the attack?

Few people have experienced as much aerospace history as Bob Brulle, and fewer still possess his meticulous recall and research skills. The P-47 fighter pilot turned engineer, inventor, educator, and author found himself immersed in the Cold War race to the moon, developing cutting-edge technology, instructing future astronauts in aerodynamics and orbital mechanics, perfecting high-performance fighter aircraft to meet the Soviet challenge, overseeing the procurement of new weapon systems, and exploring alternative energy sources. In Engineering the Space Age, he shares his unique personal insights into the triumphs and tragedies of one of the most exciting eras in American history.

Originally published in 2001. From the foreword: "In February 1999, only a few weeks before the U.S. Air Force spearheaded NATO's Allied Force air campaign against Serbia, Col. C. R. Anderegg, USAF (Ret.), visited the commander of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe. Colonel Anderegg had known Gen. John Jumper since they had served together as jet forward air controllers in Southeast Asia nearly thirty years earlier. From the vantage point of 1999, they looked back to the day in February 1970, when they first controlled a laser-guided bomb strike. In this book Anderegg takes us from "glimmers of hope" like that one through other major improvements in the Air Force that came between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. Always central in Anderegg's account of those changes are the people who made them. This is a very personal book by an officer who participated in the transformation he describes so vividly. Much of his story revolves around the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, where he served two tours as an instructor pilot specializing in guided munitions. But he also takes a look at other "Fighter Mafia" outposts in the Pentagon and elsewhere. Readers meet young Mafiosi like John Jumper, Larry Keith, Ron Keys, Joe Bob Phillips, Earl Henderson, Moody Suter, John Corder, Jim Brown, John Vickery, Jack Lefforge, Jack Ihle, Stump Bowen, Dave Dellwardt, Tommy Dyches, John Madden, and Dick Myers. As one might expect to find in a fighter pilot story, there is a lot of fun along the way. For a distilled example, consult the appendix on "Jeremiah Weed" (replete with instructions for drinking "afterburners"). Colonel Anderegg's book is likely to please anyone with an interest in fighter pilots and how they molded today's Air Force.

The U.S. Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. Van Staaveren wrote this book near the end of his distinguished government service. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought.

Discusses the terrorist truck bombing of Khobar Towers that occurred in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996. Nineteen American servicemen were killed and many people were injured. First published in 2008. Illustrated.

First published in 1978. From the preface: "This monograph is an account of the operations of armored units of the United States Army in the Republic of Vietnam. The term armored units as used here is generic and includes tank and mechanized infantry battalions and companies, armored cavalry squadrons and troops, and air cavalry squadrons and troops-all forces whose primary modus operandi was to fight mounted".

Originally published by the United States Force in 1997.

This a reprint of 1991 study published by the United States Army Center of Military History. "A Soldier Supporting Soldiers" represents the collective insights of distinguished U.S. Army logistician Joseph M. Heiser Jr. He infuses his narrative with specific firsthand experiences in the organization of combat service support, thus illuminating larger principles of not only logistics but also military leadership and ethics. Heiser describes and analyzes problems still familiar to those who provide the materials and other support required by today's Army, especially in an environment of limited resources and challenging contingency operations. Military logisticians and military policymakers will benefit greatly from the logistics lessons.

This undertaking is a work of unusual form. At its core this work is a database covering Anglo- American strategic bomber operations against Germany, Italy, and Axis associated or occupied Europe. As such it allows swift and easy listing of day-by-day bombing, bombing of strategic target systems by location and tonnage, bombing of specific countries, comparisons of US and British targeting and operations, and much more. The work details strategic operations only- B-17 and B-24 bomber sorties by the four US numbered air forces in the European and Mediterranean theaters (Eighth, Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth) and all bombing sorties for aircraft assigned to the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command and RAF 205 Group. This definition excludes US twin-engine medium bomb groups, which often hit the same aiming points as their four-engine compatriots, but includes twin-engine British Wellington medium bombers and twin-engine British Mosquito, Boston, and Ventura light bombers. Although the US heavy and medium bombers had instances of overlapping, targeting those instances usually fell into areas of what US doctrine defined as tactical rather than strategic bombing, such as frontline troops, transportation facilities feeding the front line, and airfields. US medium bombers did not fly deep into enemy country to attack industrial and strategic targets. The case differed for the RAF. Wellingtons and other medium bombers formed the backbone of the main bombing force from 1940 through late 1942 and throughout 1943 for 205 Group. Bomber Command's shortranged Bostons and Venturas of No. 2 Group raided French ports, power plants, and industrial targets until transferring to Tactical Bomber Force in May 1943. Likewise, Mosquitoes conducted numerous hit-and-run daylight raids until May of 1943 and then switched to night harassing attacks on German population centers, particularly Berlin, until the war's end. Such bombing furthered Bomber Command's campaign against the morale of the German labor force.

Includes full color maps and photographs.

The mechanism of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is widely acknowledged to be an essential component of successful peacekeeping, peace-building, postconflict management, and state-building. Security sector reform (SSR) has emerged as a promising though poorly understood tool for consolidating stability and establishing sovereignty after conflict. While DDR enables a state to recover the monopoly (or at least the preponderance) of force, SSR provides the opportunity for the state to establish the legitimacy of that monopoly.The essays in this book reflect the diversity of experience in DDR and SSR in various contexts. Despite the considerable experience acquired by the international community, the critical interrelationship between DDR and SSR and the ability to use these mechanisms with consistent success remain less than optimally developed. DDR and SSR are essential tools of modern statecraft, but their successful use is contingent upon our understanding of both the affinities and the tensions between them. These essays aim to excite further thought on how these two processes-DDR and SSR-can be implemented effectively and complimentarily to better accomplish the shared goals of viable states and enduring peace.

NASA SP 2007-4410. NASA History Series. Recounts the story of the rise of Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) and its eventual demise. Tells of organizational, cultural, and personal confrontation. Organizational skirmishes involved the Space Council versus NASA, the White House versus congressional appropriators, and the Johnson Space Center versus the rest of the space agency--all seeking control of the national space policy process.

Save for the introduction of nuclear weapons, the Soviet victory over Germany was the most fateful development of World War II. Both wrought changes and raised problems that have constantly preoccupied the world in the more than twenty years since the war ended. The purpose of this volume is to investigate one aspect of the Soviet Victory- how the war was won on the battlefield. The author sought, in following the march of the Soviet and German armies from Stalingrad to Berlin, to depict the war as it was and to describe the manner in which the Soviet Union emerged as the predominant military power in Europe. "Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East" discusses the Russo-German war from Stalingrad to Berlin. Topics include strategy and tactics, partisan and psychological warfare, coalition warfare, and manpower and production problems faced by both countries.

Originally published in 1981. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Brig. Gen Soutchay Vongsavanh, then Commanding General of Military Region 4. The study reviews and analyzes Royal Lao Government military operations in the Laotion panhandle. Special attention is devoted to the significance of the panhandle for enemy military operations in South Vietnam and Cambodia, the initiation of conventional warfare in southern Laos, lessons learned during the employment of regular and irregular forces and developments following the 1973 cease-fire.

Firs published in 1991. "Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II" is an abridgment of a two-volume work that first appeared in 1952. Organized by Major General Alfred Toppe and written with the assistance of nine German commanders who served in North Africa, the manuscript represents a collaborative attempt to determine as many factors as possible which exerted a determining influence on desert warfare. Issues addressed include planning, intelligence, logistics, and operations. Described and analyzed are the German order of battle, the major military engagements in North Africa, and the particular problems of terrain and climate in desert operations. Not unlike many of the U.S. units engaged in the war with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in the desert only after they arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its own terms. For this reason alone, as well as for the insights it offers, Desert Warfare requires the serious consideration of those responsible for preparing the U.S. military for any future conflict in desert terrain.

Originally published in 1973. Illustrated with maps, charts and photographs.

First published in 2003. The NATO-led Operation Allied Force was fought in 1999 to stop Serb atrocities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. This war, as noted by the distinguished military historian John Keegan, "marked a real turning point . . . and proved that a war can be won by airpower alone." Colonels Haave and Haun have organized firsthand accounts of some of the people who provided that airpower-the members of the 40th Expeditionary Operations Group. Their descriptions-a new wingman's first combat sortie, a support officer's view of a fighter squadron relocation during combat, and a Sandy's leadership in finding and rescuing a downed F-117 pilot-provide the reader with a legitimate insight into an air war at the tactical level and the airpower that helped convince the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, to capitulate.

First published in 1978. From the preface: "The purpose of this monograph is to relate in specific terms what logisticians did and how they did it in supporting combat forces in Vietnam. Not only were American soldiers supported, but at the height of hostilities, in addition to U.S. Forces, the U.S. Army in Vietnam also provided support to the military forces of the governments of South Vietnam, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and other allied countries".

Originally published in 1991 this is a rReprint of volume 9 of the U.S. Naval War College historical monograph series.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.